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RECENT CASE
THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SECTOR
UNION SECURITY IN THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT: HUDSON V. CHICAGO
TEACHERS UNION LOCAL 1
INTRODUCTION
The doctrines of exclusive representation and union security are central to
both the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)l and the Railway Labor Act
(RLA). 2 Exclusive representation3 extinguishes the individual employee's power
to conduct private negotiations with an employer and vests that power with
the union.4 The union, as chosen representative, must fairly represent all
employees in the bargaining unit, whether or not they are union members.'
Congress believed that exclusive representation by the union would promote
labor stability. 6
The doctrine of union security requires both union and non-union members
of the bargaining unit to share in the costs of representation. 7 Despite
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 158(a)(3) (1982).
2. 45 U.S.C. § 152 Fourth, Eleventh (1982).
3. The doctrine of exclusive representation requires that an employer bargain solely with
the union that represents a majority of the employees within the appropriate bargaining unit.
The employer must also refrain from bargaining with rival unions or individual employees. The
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act [NLRA], 29 U.S.C. § 159(a), provides: "Rep-
resentatives designated or selected for the purpose of collective bargaining by the majority of
the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining ...." See infra note
6 and accompanying text. See also Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 61-62 (1975) (reaffirming doctrine of exclusive representation in collective
bargaining). For a criticism of the doctrine of exclusive representation, see Vieira, Of Syndi-
calism, Slavery and the Thirteenth Amendment: The Unconstitutionality of "Exclusive Repre-
sentation" in Public-Sector Employment, 12 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 515 (1976).
4. See NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
5. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 199-202 (1944).
6. See H.R. REP. No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1935) (labor stability not feasible
without majority rule); S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1935) (object of NLRA is
to stabilize business conditions).
7. "Union security" is generally defined as a doctrine that requires every employee in the
bargaining unit to either join the union or pay the union a specified amount for its bargaining
services. There are five basic forms of union security agreements. Closed shop agreements
require that the employer hire only union members and condition employment on continued
union membership. See, e.g., NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(3), 158(b)(2) (1982) and the RLA, §
2 Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982) (closed shop agreements not authorized in the
private sector). Union shop provisions allow the employer to hire non-union members but
require all employees to join the union within a specified time period. The agency shop requires
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congressional approval of union security, some courts have viewed the
doctrine with considerable disfavor.' These courts, as well as numerous
commentators, have been troubled by the constitutional implications of
compelling employees to join or contribute to private organizations. 9 Op-
ponents of union security contend that compulsory union affiliation and
financial subsidization infringe upon objecting employees" freedom of speech
and freedom of association under the first and fourteenth amendments.)]
Proponents of union security maintain that, because the union has a legal
duty of representing all employees, each employee should contribute their
fair share of the costs involved in such representation. 2 The debate over
union security primarily concerns the public sector because there is no
uniform federal legislation in this area. 3 As such, the debate centers in those
states that have enacted union security provisions governing the public
sector. '4
non-union members to pay union fees and dues but does not require membership. Fair share
or service fee arrangements permit employees to choose not to join the union, but require non-
members to pay the union a service fee equal to that portion of union dues devoted to collective
bargaining activities. Maintenance-of-membership agreements do not require union membership,
but do require all employees who voluntarily become union members to remain members for
the term of the contract.
Dues checkoff plans often accompany union security plans. These plans allow the employer
to deduct union fees from employees' earnings and transfer the funds directly to the union.
For a complete discussion of union security, see R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW
UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 639-76 (1976), T. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM,
THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS (1977), Zwerdling, The Liberation of Public Employees: Union
Security in the Public Sector, 17 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 993 (1976), and Note, Public
Sector Labor Relations: Union Security Agreements in the Public Sector Since Abood, 33
S.C.L. REV. 521, 524 (1982).
8. See. e.g., Schleck v. Freeborn County Welfare Bd., 88 L.R.R.M. 3525 (Freeborn County
Conciliation Ct. Minn. 1975); Local 194, New Jersey Turnpike Employees Union v. New Jersey
Turnpike Auth., 64 N.J. 579, 319 A.2d 224 (1974); Foltz v. City of Dayton, 27 Ohio App. 2d
35, 272 N.E.2d 169 (1970).
9. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 7, at 271-94; Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues: An
Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. REV. 233, 234 (1959); Zwerdling, supra note 7, at 1004-05.
10. The terms "objecting employees" and "dissenting employees" will be used interchange-
ably throughout this Recent Case to represent employees who object to paying fair share fees.
II. See Blair, Union Security Agreements in Public Employment, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 183,
190-99 (1975) (outlining the constitutional implications of public sector union security agree-
ments). See also Levison, After Abood: Public Sector Union Security and the Protection of
Individual Public Employee Rights, 27 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1977) (union's duty of fair represen-
tation is inadequate protection for individual employee against the potential abuse by the union
operating under union security provisions). Cf. Note, supra note 7, at 523 n.17 (discussion of
National Right to Work Committee's 25 year fight against compulsory unionism).
12. See Blair, supra note II, at 189, 190; Palombo, The Agency Shop in a Public Service
Merit System, 26 LAB. L.J. 409, 411-12 (1975); Zwerdling, supra note 7, at 1010, 1011.
13. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1982).
14. See. e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.110(b), (b)(2) (1983) (union shop and fair share
provisions for all public employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3502.5 (West Supp. 1985) (agency shop
provision for local employees); id. § 3515.7(a) (maintenance-of-membership and fair share
provisions for state civil servants); id. § 3540.1(i)(1)(2) (West 1980) (maintenance-of-membership
and fair share provisions for public school employees); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 5-280(a) (Supp.
1984) (union shop provision for state employees); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 89-4(a) (Supp. 1983)
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The United States Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of state
statutes that authorize certain forms of public sector union security. Yet,
many issues remain unresolved as is evidenced by the Seventh Circuit's recent
decision in Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local 1.15 In Hudson the
Seventh Circuit invalidated a statutorily authorized fair share provision in a
collective bargaining agreement between the Chicago Teachers Union (CTU)
and the Board of Education of the City of Chicago (the Board)., 6 The
plaintiffs, who were non-union employees, challenged both the CTU's pro-
cedure for reviewing objections to the union's use of the fair share fee and
the remedy provided to non-members who succeeded in their objections. 7
The court concluded that the internal union procedure and the advance
reduction and rebate remedy were constitutionally deficient."s
Although the Hudson court properly criticized the internal union proce-
dure, its decision to invalidate large parts of the CTU's fair share system
(agency shop provision for all public employees); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, § 1606 (Supp. 1984)
(fair share provision for all public employees); id. § 1711 (fair share provision for public school
teachers); Ky. REV. STAT. § 345.050(l)(C) (1983) (union shop provision for firefighters); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 26, § 1027(3) (Supp. 1984-1985) (all forms of union security, except
closed shop, available to state university employees); MD. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 6-504(b) (Supp.
1984) (agency shop provision for Prince George's County non-certified public school employees);
id. § 6-504(c) (fair share provision for Montgomery & Allegheny Counties non-certified public
school employees); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 12 (West 1982) (agency shop provision
for all public employees); MICH. CompJ,. LAWS § 423.210(l)(c) (1979) (agency shop provision
for all public employees); MINN. STAT. § 179.65(2) (Supp. 1984) (fair share provision for all
public employees); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-31-401(3) (1983) (agency shop provision for all
public employees); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.5(a)(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985) (fair share
provision for all public employees); id. § 34.13B-2 (1965) (union shop provision for public
utility employees); N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW § 208 (3) (McKinney 1983) (agency shop provision
for specified civil service employees); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.09(c) (Baldwin 1984) (fair
share provision for state employees); OR. REV. STAT. § 243.666(1) (1983) (union ship and agency
shop provision for all public employees); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 101.705 (Purdon Supp.
1965-1981) (maintenance-of-membership provision for all public employees); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 28-9.3-7 (1979) (agency shop provision for teachers); id. at § 36-11-2 (Supp. 1984) (agency
shop provision for state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1726(a)(8) (1978) (union shop
or agency shop provision for all municipal employees); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 41.56.122(1)
(Supp. 1985) (union shop provision for all public employees); id. § 41.59.100 (agency shop
provision for teachers); Wis. STAT. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1984-1985) (fair share provision for
municipal employees); id. § 111.81(9) (fair share provision for state employees).
15. 743 F.2d 1187 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
16. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22.40a (1981) stated:
Where a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an employee repre-
sentative organization, the school board may include in the agreement a provision
requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of the repre-
sentative organization to pay their proportionate share of the cost of the collective
bargaining process and contract administration, measured by the amount of dues
uniformly required by members. In such case, proportionate share payments shall
be deducted by the board from the earnings of the non-member employees and
paid to the representative organization.
This statute has been replaced by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1706, 1711 (1983); see infra note
100.
17. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1191.
18. Id. at 1196, 1197. See infra notes 81-136 and accompanying text.
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disregarded prior Supreme Court decisions that approved efforts similar to
those utilized by the CTU. 19 Moreover, the court's decision places excessive
burdens on the public employer and destroys the delicate balance of labor-
management relations in the public sector. 0 Hudson has significant impli-
cations for the future of public sector unionization in the Seventh Circuit.
This Recent Case reviews the legal evolution of union security in the public
sector and analyzes the Hudson decision against that background.
LEGAL EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE OF
UNION SECURITY IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The constitutionality of union security was initially challenged in a 1956
case involving private sector unionization under the RLA. In Railway Em-
ployees Department v. Hanson,2 non-union employees challenged § 2 Elev-
enth of the RLA; which permitted a union and an employer to make union
membership a condition of employment. 22 The Supreme Court determined
that the provision did not violate the dissenting employees' first and fifth
amendment rights. 23 The dissenting employees contended that § 2 Eleventh
violated their first amendment right not to associate by forcing them to join
an organization whose political beliefs they did not share.24 The plaintiffs
also argued that § 2 Eleventh violated their fifth amendment rights by forcing
them to pay for activities unrelated to collective bargaining. 2 The Supreme
Court nevertheless upheld § 2 Eleventh as a permissible use of Congress'
power to regulate interstate commerce and preserve the peaceful operations
of America's railroads. 26 The Court also held that, to the extent that dues
were used to support "the work of the union in the realm of collective
bargaining," 27 the dissenters' first amendment rights were not unreasonably
impaired. 2
19. See infra notes 98, 119, 123-25, 134, and accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 137-41.
21. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
22. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982) provides in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or
law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or
carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations
duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the
requirements of this chapter shall be permitted - (a) to make agreements, requiring,
as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the
beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever
is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization repre-
senting their craft or class . . .(b) to make agreements providing for the deduction
by such carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or
class and payment to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such
employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including
fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
membership.
23. 351 U.S. at 230.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 235-38.
27. Id. at 235.
28. Id. at 238.
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The Court limited the Hanson holding in two subsequent decisions. In the
1961 decision of International Association of Machinists v. Street,29 the
Supreme Court limited union authority to spend fair share fees on political
activity under § 2 Eleventh. In Street, non-union employees claimed that
portions of their dues were spent, over their protest, to finance political
activities." The Court ruled in favor of the employees and held that § 2
Eleventh did not authorize a union to spend non-members' dues on "political
causes." 3' The Court, however, did not "delineate the precise limits" of the
prohibited expenditures.32 Subsequently, in Brotherhood of Ry. and S.S.
Clerks v. Allen," the Court held that § 2 Eleventh authorized unions to
charge objecting employees only for those expenditures "germane to collec-
tive bargaining. '3 4
Relying heavily on the RLA cases, the Supreme Court first addressed the
constitutionality of union security in the public sector in the 1977 decision
of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education." In Abood, Detroit public school
teachers challenged the validity of a Michigan statute that authorized unions
and local school boards to negotiate "agency shop" agreements.36 Under the
agreement, employees could elect not to join the union. Non-union employ-
ees, however, had to pay a service charge equal to full union dues.17 The
teachers claimed that the agency shop clause violated their freedom of
association under the first and fourteenth amendments.3" The Court, relying
on Street and Hanson, held that charging non-union members fees to finance
collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment was
constitutionally permissible.39 The Court rejected a public-private sector
distinction in analyzing the constitutionality of labor legislation. Public
employees, according to the Court, did not have a weightier first amendment
29. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
30. Id. at 744. The plaintiffs in Street complained that the union was using a substantial
part of the compelled fees to finance the political campaigns of national, state, and local
candidates favored by the union.
31. Id. at 750.
32. Id. at 768.
33. 373 U.S. 113 (1963).
34. Id. at 121. In Allen, a group of non-union employees sued to enjoin enforcement of a
union shop agreement entered into between a railroad and several unions representing the
railroad's employees. The Court held that the necessary predicate to an appropriate remedy is
the division of the union's political expenditures from those expenditures germane to collective
bargaining, "since only the former .. .are not authorized by § 2 Eleventh." Id.
35. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
36. MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 423.21(l)(c) (1973) provided, in pertinent part:
[Niothing in this act or in any law of this state shall preclude a public employer
from making an agreement with an exclusive bargaining representative ... to require
as a condition of employment that all employees in the bargaining unit pay to the
exclusive bargaining representative a service fee equivalent to the amount of dues
uniformly required of members of the exclusive bargaining representative ......
37. Id.
38. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213.
39. Id. at 225-26.
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interest in withholding fees from the union for the costs of exclusive union
representation than their private sector counterparts."
Although Abood represented a major step in the evolution of public sector
labor law, it left important issues unresolved. For instance, the Court did
not identify categories of permissible union expenditures, 4 nor did the Court
resolve the question of which remedies would be appropriate to protect
dissenters' rights. The Court noted, however, that in devising a remedy it
must balance objecting employees' rights to be free from compulsory sub-
sidization of ideological activities with the union's duty of fair representa-
tion.42
After Abood, lower courts grappled inconsistently with the problems of
developing remedies"' and delineating the precise limits of impermissible
expenditures. 44 In 1984, the Supreme Court attempted to provide guidance
to the courts in Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks. 45 In
Ellis, non-union members challenged both numerous union expenditures
46
under § 2 Eleventh of the RLA and the union's rebate remedy.4 7 The plaintiffs
first argued that the union's use of non-members fees to finance various
union activities, including national conventions, social activities, monthly
40. Id. at 229. The Court stated that "[tihe very real differences between exclusive agent
collective bargaining in the public and private sectors are not such as to work any greater
infringement upon the First Amendment interests of public employees. A public employee who
believes that a union representing him is urging a course that is unwise as a matter of public
policy is not barred from expressing his viewpoint." Id. at 230.
41. Id. at 236. The Court noted that there would be "difficult problems in drawing lines
between collective-bargaining activities ... and ideological activities unrelated to collective
bargaining," and that in the public sector "the line may be somewhat hazier." Id.
42. Id. at 237. The Court suggested that a proper remedy would include: (1) a refund of
that portion of the exacted fund representing impermissible expenditures; and (2) the reduction
of future dues by the same proportion. Id. at 240. The Court also suggested that unions should
develop "voluntary plan[s] by which dissenters would be afforded an internal union remedy."
Id. (citing Allen, 373 U.S. at 122). The union in Abood required dissenting employees to object
at the beginning of each school year to the use of their agency fees for political or ideological
expenditures. The dissenting employees were then entitled to a pro rata refund of their agency
fees in accordance with the union's calculation of expenses made on impermissible activities.
Brief of Appellee at 19b, Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
43. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir.
1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984); Robinson v. New Jersey, 565 F.
Supp. 942, 946, 949 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 1228 (1985); School Comm. v. Greenfield Educ. Ass'n, 385 Mass. 70, 85, 431 N.E.2d 180,
189 (1982); Kempner v. AFL-CIO Local 2077, 126 Mich. App. 452, 459-60, 337 N.W.2d 354,
357-58 (1983), appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 316 (1985); White Cloud Educ. Ass'n v. Board of
Educ., 101 Mich. App. 309, 319, 300 N.W.2d 551, 555 (1980); Ball v. City of Detroit, 84 Mich.
App. 383, 397, 269 N.W.2d 607, 613 (1978).
44. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1074-75 (9th
Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984); NLRB v. Operating Engineers
Local 138, 385 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1967); Robinson v. New Jersey, 547 F. Supp. 1297, 1316
(D.N.J. 1982), modified on other grounds, 656 F. Supp. 942 (D.N.J. 1983), rev'd, 741 F.2d
598 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1228 (1985).
45. 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984).
46. Id. at 1892-95.
47. Id. at 1889-90.
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publications, organizing activities, and litigation, 4 violated their first amend-
ment right not to associate 9.4 The Court substantially rejected the dissenters'
claims stating that "the test must be whether the challenged expenditures
[were] necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the
duties of an exclusive representative of the employees in dealing with the
employer on labor-management issues." 50 After analyzing each expenditure
in light of the new test, the Court concluded that all of the disputed
expenditures, except those for organizing activities, were connected to exclu-
sive representation."
The plaintiffs also challenged the adequacy of the union's rebate proce-
dures. Under the program, the union exacted full dues from non-members
and months later rebated that portion that represented impermissible ex-
penditures. 2 The Court held the rebate scheme to be inadequate. 3 The Court
suggested "readily available" alternatives to retaining the dissenters' dues,
such as "advance reduction of dues and/or interest bearing escrow accounts
.. . . -4In light of the feasibility of the identified alternatives, the Court
ruled that the union's pure rebate scheme violated the RLA. 5
While the Supreme Court did not forthrightly assert the constitutionality
of an advance reduction scheme or escrow account, several lower courts
nevertheless interpreted Ellis as sanctioning the alternatives. 6 In contrast to
48. Id. at 1887-88. The plaintiffs also challenged the union's charge for death benefits. Id.
The Court did not reach the death benefits issue because the union had been decertified during
the pendency of the litigation. Id. at 1895.
49. See Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir.
1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984).
50. 104 S. Ct. at 1892.
51. The challenged expenditures included:
National Conventions. The Court had "very little trouble" in holding that non-members
must help defray the costs of the union's national conventions. Id. at 1892-93. The Court held
that convention activities "guide the union's approach to collective bargaining and are directly
related to its effectiveness in negotiating labor agreements." Id. at 1893 (citing Ellis v. Broth-
erhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d at 1073).
Social Activities. The Court held that expenses for refreshments at union functions were
"sufficiently related to [collective bargaining] to be charged to all employees." Id.
Monthly Publications. Since non-members were not charged for the portion of the monthly
magazine devoted to "political causes," the Court held that the union could validly charge
non-members for the publication. Id.
Organizing Activities. The Court however found that organizing expenditures "only in the
most distant way" worked to the benefit of those already paying dues. Id. at 1984.
Litigation. Insofar as litigation expenses were related to negotiating and administering the
contract, settling grievance disputes, or representing employees in disputes with other unions,
the Court held that litigation expenses were clearly chargeable to non-members. Id. at 1895.
52. Id. at 1889-90. For a complete discussion of the "pure rebate" remedy struck down by
the Supreme Court in Ellis, see Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d
1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984).
53. 104 S. Ct. at 1890.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. In Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 128
(1985), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit relied on Abood and Ellis in upholding the
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those courts, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Hudson rejected a
rebate remedy of the type recommended in Ellis.
THE Hudson DECISION:
FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The CTU serves as the exclusive representative of approximately 27,500
employees in bargaining with the Board.57 Membership in the CTU is vol-
untary and for several years the CTU had unsuccessfully attempted to
negotiate a fair share provision into its labor contracts with the Board.
The CTU's efforts were frustrated because the Board was unauthorized
under Illinois law to agree to a fair share provision. 8 In 1981, the Illinois
legislature passed a statute that expressly authorized the Board and the union
to include a fair share clause in its collective bargaining agreements. 9
constitutionality of a fair share provision in a New Jersey public employee statute. The statute
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the majority
representative and the public employer of public employees in an appropriate unit
shall, where requested by the majority representative, negotiate concerning the
subject of requiring the payment by all nonmember employees in the unit to the
majority representative of a representation fee in lieu of dues for services rendered
by the majority representative.
(b) The representative fee in lieu of dues shall be in an amount equivalent to
the regular membership dues . . . less the cost of benefits . . . available to or
benefiting only its members, but in no event shall such fee exceed 85o of the
regular membership dues, fees and assessments.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34-13A-5.5(a)(b) (West Supp. 1984-1985).
The Robinson decision was a consolidation of three separate appeals, all of which challenged
the constitutionality of the remedy provided by the New Jersey statute's fair share provision
under the first and fourteenth amendments. 741 F.2d at 601. In rejecting appellant's claims
and recognizing the competing governmental interest in maintaining labor peace, the Third
Circuit concluded that due process required only a balanced remedy that would prevent
involuntary subsidization of political expenditures without burdening legitimate union functions.
Id. at 612. According to the court, the New Jersey statute incorporated such a balance. The
statute provided for a minimum 150o differential between full union dues and dues charged
non-members. The unions in the suit had also voluntarily created an escrow system for the
challenged portion of the representation fee. The court held that this procedure incorporated
both of the protective mechanisms suggested by Ellis. Id.
In Tierney v. City of Toledo, 116 L.R.R.M. 3475 (N.D. Ohio 1984), the court denied a
preliminary injunction against the implementation of an agency shop rebate remedy and an
internal union procedure authorized by the City of Toledo Municipal Code. Id. at 3476. Under
the rebate procedure, dissenters had to register their objections to expenditures by January 31
of each year. At that time, a preliminary refund would be calculated and deposited in an
interest-bearing escrow account. At the end of each year, an arbitrator would determine the
final refund plus any interest owed to the dissenters. Id. After 1983, dissenters were granted
an advanced reduction based upon the percentage used in the previous year to calculate the
dissenting fee payors' final refund. Id. Comparing this procedure with the alternatives suggested
in Ellis, the court held that this procedure fell within "the constitutionally viable alternatives
outlined therein." Id. at 3477.
57. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. I, 573 F. Supp. 1505, 1507 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
58. Id.
59. See supra note 16.
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Pursuant to the newly enacted statute, the CTU and the Board agreed to
include a fair share provision in their 1982 collective bargaining agreement.6"
Shortly after signing the agreement, the CTU amended its constitution and
bylaws to grant itself authority to charge and calculate a fair share fee and
to review complaints by dissenting employees about the use of the fee. The
CTU assessed the non-members' fair share fee at ninety-five percent of full
union dues, and the Board deducted the fee from the non-members' earnings
and paid it directly to the union.61 Under the CTU's Implementation Plan,
objecting non-members could complain to the CTU president by registered
mail within thirty days of their first payroll deduction. 62 The objection would
then be considered by the CTU's Executive Committee. The Committee
would decide within thirty days whether it would grant an additional reduc-
tion to the complaining employee. Objectors could then appeal the decision
and receive a personal hearing before the Committee. From there, objectors
could arbitrate their claim with the union. The arbitrator would be selected
by the CTU president from a list of accredited arbitrators maintained by
the Illinois State Board of Education. The CTU would bear the costs of the
arbitration.
The plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the Illinois statute authorizing the fair share policy. 63 The court
60. Article 1, § 8.2 of the one year collective bargaining agreement between the CTU and
the Board read in pertinent part:
All full-time employees covered by this Agreement who are not members of
the UNION shall, commencing sixty (60) days after their employment or the effective
date of the Agreement, whichever is later, and continuing during the term of this
Agreement, and so long as they remain non-members of the UNION, pay to the
UNION each month their proportionate share of the cost of the collective bargaining
process and contract administration measured by the amount of dues uniformly
required by members of the UNION. Such proportionate share payments shall be
deducted by the BOARD from the earnings of the non-member full-time employees
and paid to the UNION. The UNION shall submit to the BOARD an affidavit
which specifies the amount which constitutes said proportionate share which shall
not exceed the dues uniformly required of members of the UNION.
61. The Board's deduction of the agency fee was crucial in the court's finding that the
plaintiffs were entitled to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides in pertinent
part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other persons within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
Id. Since a public employer assisted the union in "coercing public employees to finance political
activities," there was state action. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1191. Moreover, the court held that
when a private entity such as a union acted in concert with a public agency to "deprive people
of their federal constitutional rights," the private entity was liable under § 1983 along with the
public agency. Id.
62. For a complete discussion of the CTU Implementation Plan, see Hudson v. Chicago
Teachers Union, Local No. I, 573 F. Supp. 1505, 1508 (N.D. I11. 1983), rev'd, 743 F.2d 1187
(7th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 2700 (1985).
63. Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1., 573 F. Supp. 1505, 1507 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
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found that the statute was facially constitutional under Abood.64 The court
also determined that the pre-deduction adjustment scheme, coupled with the
rebate system, minimized the risk of unauthorized expenditures of non-
members' funds. 6 Finally, the court held that the CTU Implementation Plan,
adopted under color of the Illinois statute, did not violate the dissenters'
procedural due process rights under the fourteenth amendment. 66
On appeal, the dissenters limited their challenge to the constitutionality of
the rebate system and procedural aspects of the CTU Implementation Plan.67
In reversing the lower court, the Seventh Circuit held that the internal union
procedure violated the fourteenth amendment because it was "entirely con-
trolled by the union." '6 The court was particularly troubled by the CTU's
use of arbitration to review the dissenters' objections.61
The Seventh Circuit noted three problems with the CTU's use of arbitrators
to adjudicate dissenters' rights. First, the Court objected to the CTU's power
to appoint arbitrators. The court stated that the union's potential hostility
towards dissenting non-members raised serious doubts about the propriety
of allowing the union a unilateral choice of arbitrators.7" Second, the court
disapproved of the CTU's control of the arbitrator's salary. Since the CTU
64. Id. at 1513. The district court reasoned that the statute empowered the Board "to agree
to no more than that which the Supreme Court expressly approved in Abood." Id. Because
the statute limited the fee to a proportionate share of the costs of collective bargaining, non-
members would not be required to pay 100%Vo of full union dues. Since non-members were not
charged for that portion of the union dues earmarked for political causes, there was no first
amendment violation, and the district court therefore found the statute to be constitutional.
Id.
65. Specifically, the district court applied the "least restrictive means" test developed in
Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973). Hudson, 573 F. Supp. at 1515-20. Applying this test,
the court held that the CTU Implementation Plan posed only a "negligible" risk of violating
the dissenters' first amendment rights, while it guaranteed the CTU the "immediate, steady flow
of funds it needs to represent all employees, including non-members." Id. (emphasis in original).
The district court therefore concluded that the plan was the least restrictive means of effectuating
the government's interest in maintaining labor harmony. Id.
66. Id. at 1520-21. In handling the plaintiffs' due process claim, the court balanced the
conflicting claims of the employees and the union by weighing three factors: (1) the plaintiffs'
liberty and property interests; (2) the government's administrative interests; and (3) the risk of
erroneous deprivation through the challenged procedures. Id. at 1521 (citing Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). The district court stated that the compelling interest in
sustaining regular fees, coupled with the low risk of abridgment of dissenters' rights, did not
justify the high cost of imposing a pre-deduction hearing. 573 F. Supp. at 1521.
67. 743 F.2d at 1191. The plaintiffs' primary claim was that the CTU's internal union
procedure was fundamentally flawed under the principle that "no man should be a judge in
his own case." Brief for Plaintiff at 30, Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union, 743 F.2d 1187
(7th Cir. 1984) (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) [hereinafter cited as Brief
for Plaintiff]. The plaintiffs claimed that a review of their objections by the opposing party's
representatives presumptively foreclosed an impartial hearing. Brief for Plaintiff, supra, at 30.
68. 743 F.2d at 1194-95.
69. Id. at 1195.
70. Id. The court noted that "the union's interest and those of the individual employee are
not always identical or even compatible." Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104
S. Ct. 1799, 1804 (1984)).
1985] HUDSON v. CHICAGO TEACHERS UNION #1 847
paid the salary, the court believed that an arbitrator might have a financial
interest in deciding in favor of the union.' Finally, the court noted that in
reviewing fair share objections, arbitrators would be called upon to make
first amendment determinations.7 2 Because many arbitrators are not attor-
neys, the Seventh Circuit questioned the competency of arbitrators to decide
constitutional questions. 7
The court decided that the public employer should administer the review
process.7 4 According to the court, a fair review procedure should assure that
non-members' fair share fees would be spent only on those union activities
germane to collective bargaining. 75 The Seventh Circuit suggested in dicta
that an adequate procedure would include at minimum: 1) fair notice; 2) a
prompt evidentiary hearing before the Board of Education or some other
state or local agency;76 and 3) a right of judicial review of the agency's
decision. 77 The court concluded that the CTU's internal union remedy and
arbitration procedure did not satisfy due process, given the possible bias of
union procedures toward union interests.'
The Seventh Circuit also invalidated the CTU rebate remedy. The court
held that a union could not "just choose" some level for the fair share fee
and deduct that amount from non-members' earnings. If the union chose
too high a fee, it would have the use of non-members fees interest-free
during the period between the deduction and the rebate.79 The court stated
that this remedy effectively created an involuntary loan to the union which
could be used for impermissible purposes.8 0
ANALYSIS & CRITICISM
The Internal Union Procedure
The Supreme Court has never ruled directly on the constitutionality of
particular internal union procedures, although it tentatively sanctioned cer-
tain procedures in Abood."' The Court generally approves of internal union
procedures as a means of settling disputes over alleged impermissible ex-
penditures."' Many lower courts have recognized and approved of the use
71. 743 F.2d at 1195.
72. Id. at 1195-96.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1192, 1194.
75. Id. at 1194.
76. Evidentiary safeguards in administrative hearings often include the right to call witnesses,
the right to face accusors, and the right to a decision based solely on the evidence of record.
Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267, 1279-1304 (1975). For a complete
discussion of evidentiary safeguards in administrative hearings see 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 12 (2d ed. 1979).




81. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
82. Allen, 373 U.S. at 122-24; Abood, 431 U.S. at 239-42.
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of internal procedures as a more practical alternative to judicially adminis-
tered relief."
The Seventh Circuit, however, declined to follow those courts which
sanctioned internal union procedures. The court reasoned that, because the
union might not represent non-members fairly, the use of union-sponsored
arbitration to protect dissenters' constitutional rights was inadequate.8 4 The
court properly criticized certain aspects of the internal procedure. The like-
lihood of union bias in union-sponsored arbitration lessened the fairness of
the procedure, especially since individual constitutional rights were involved.85
Other courts also share the Seventh Circuit's concern about the competence
of arbitrators to decide constitutional questions. 6
Although the CTU procedures may not have been ideal, the Seventh
Circuit's remedial suggestions are flawed in even more serious ways. For
instance, the court did not say whether the evidentiary hearing should take
place before or after the employer deducts the fees. The plaintiffs in Hudson
had argued that a pre-deduction hearing was necessary to protect their
constitutional rights since fair share deductions presented a risk of erroneous
deprivation of their liberty.17 A pre-deduction hearing would prohibit the
union from collecting any portion of a non-members fee until an impartial
adjudicator reviewed the union's fair share calculations.
83. See, e.g., Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105
S. Ct. 1228 (1985); Fort Wayne Educ. Ass'n v. Goetz, 443 N.E.2d 364, 373 (Ind. App. 1982);
Kempner v. AFL-CIO Local 2077, 126 Mich. App. 452, 461, 337 N.W.2d 354, 357-58 (1983),
appeal dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 316 (1985); Robbinsdale Educ. Ass'n v. Robbinsdale Fed'n of
Teachers Local 872, 307 Minn. 96, 102-07, 239 N.W.2d 437, 441-42 (1976), vacated and
remanded, 429 U.S. 880 (1976), original decision reinstated sub. nom, Threlkeld v. Robbinsdale
Fed'n of Teachers Local 872, 307 Minn. 96, 316 N.W.2d 551 (1982).
84. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1195.
85. See, e.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-62 (1975). But
see Reid v. UAW, Dist. 1093, 479 F.2d 517 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1076
(1976). In Reid, dissenting employees sought an injunction against union expenditures on political
activities. The union agreed that its internal procedures, which allowed employees to obtain a
rebate of their dues, provided the plaintiffs with all the relief to which they were entitled under
Allen. 479 F.2d at 518-19. Since employees had not exhausted the union remedies or proved
that the procedures were "unfair, unreasonable, and unworkable," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
summary judgment against the employees. Id. at 520-21. The court held that "speculative,
conclusionary, and argumentative statements" condemning the union procedure as unfair did
not suffice to create issues of fact. Id. at 520. The court concluded that such statements were
at most "conjectures as to how the union remedy might work in imagined circumstances." Id.
86. See generally McDonald v. City of West Branch, 104 S. Ct. 1799, 1803 n.9 (1984) (non-
lawyer arbitrators may not have the expertise to resolve complex legal questions arising in
constitutional actions); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981)
(an arbitrator may not adequately protect employees' statutory rights since the arbitrator's
specialized competence is in the law of the shop, not the law of the land); see also Speech
presented by Professor Elliot Goldstein to the Fourth Annual Chicago Arbitration Day Con-
vention (October 31, 1984) (noting the Supreme Court's shift away from private dispute
settlement through arbitration as a final remedy for statutory or constitutional employee
rights). But see Parrett v. City of Connersville, 737 F.2d 690, 696-97 (7th Cir. 1984), cert.
dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 828 (1985) (procedures established under collective bargaining contracts,
including arbitration, can satisfy constitutional requirements).
87. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 67, at 36-39.
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It is doubtful that the court intended to impose a pre-deduction require-
ment on the CTU. First, such a requirement would be inconsistent with
language in the Supreme Court's Ellis decision that encouraged the use of
procedures that did not unduly burden legitimate union functioning.88 Sec-
ond, the Hudson decision does not exhibit the careful weighing of state and
private interests which ordinarily accompanies such due process determina-
tions. 89 The procedural protections to which private parties are entitled
depend on a balancing of the parties' interests in each case.90 Therefore,
when determining whether a pre-deduction hearing is necessary, courts must
examine the effect of the deprivation on the party 9l and the nature of the
governmental function involved. 2 The deprivation of liberty suffered by non-
members in Hudson was de minimus under the CTU's advance reduction
scheme. 93 In addition, the Supreme Court has recognized the substantial
governmental interest in labor harmony advanced by a union's use of
compelled fees. 4 The financial and administrative burdens of pre-deduction
hearings on unions could bring an abrupt end to the use of union security
in the Seventh Circuit. A weighing of the competing interests involved would
therefore indicate that procedural due process requirements would be satisfied
by a post-deduction hearing. 95
Independent of the timing of the hearing, it is doubtful that a public
employer is an appropriate agent to champion the constitutional rights of
88. See infra text accompanying notes 131-33. See also Developments in the Law, Public
Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611, 1733-34 (1984) (Ellis Court rejected pre-deduction
hearings as overly burdensome).
89. See, e.g., Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 610 (1974) ("[tlhe very nature
of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every
imaginable situation") (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895 (1961)); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 351 (1938) (due process
is a flexible standard which does not guarantee any particular form or procedure).
90. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 624 (1974).
91. See, e.g., North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601, 608 (1975)
(probability that deprivation will cause "irreparable injury" is sufficiently great to require prior
hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 (1970) (individuals who may suffer "grevious
loss[es]" must be given a pre-determination hearing); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 340 (1969) (prior hearing necessary because prejudgment garnishment is a deprivation
causing "tremendous hardship").
92. Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 624 (1974).
93. The monetary loss, if any, suffered by the non-members in Hudson would only amount
to the difference between the fair share fee ($16.48 per month) and the amount later calculated
after objections and adjustments. 573 F. Supp. at 1519. Even if the CTU had grossly miscal-
culated the fair share fee by as much as 50%, the error over the six week rebate period would
be only $24.72 per school teacher. Id.
94. See, e.g., Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1896 (union interference with first amendment rights is
justified by government's interest in maintaining industrial peace); Abood, 431 U.S. at 222,
223 (union security is applicable in public sector because desirability of labor peace is no less
important in public sector than in private sector); Street, 367 U.S. at 761-71 (collective
bargaining, exclusive representation, and union security give unions the power to effectuate
congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations); Hanson, 351 U.S. at 233-34 (Congress
recognized union security as a stabilizing force in labor-management relations).
95. See supra note 66.
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dissenting employees in their disputes with a union.96 Fair share provisions
are strictly an internal union issue. The employer's only involvement with
the fair share issue is to accept a fair share provision in the collective
bargaining agreement. After Hudson, however, public employers in the
Seventh Circuit will have the burden of adjudicating union disputes. Also,
as the district court noted, when the employer becomes the insurer of its
employees' constitutional rights, the employer can veto a union's expenditures
under the guise of protecting employee rights. 97 Both employers and unions
will therefore become more reluctant to include fair share provisions in
collective bargaining agreements. This result is plainly inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent encouraging the use of union security. 9
The Seventh Circuit had better alternative procedures available to protect
the interests of the union, the non-members, and the public employer. One
such plan would, like the CTU plan, require the union to determine the fair
share fee in advance. To invoke the review procedures, dissenters would
notify the union of their objections and have their cases heard by neutral
panels. Throughout the review, the union would bear the burden of proving
that the fair share fee was reasonably calculated. 99 If the objecting non-
members successfully presented their case, the union would rebate the amount
of impermissible expenditures already deducted and would reduce future
deductions proportionately. Such a plan would properly balance the public
policy interest in preserving union security with the dissenters' first amend-
ment interests. It would protect objecting employees from financing political
causes they oppose without burdening the union's statutory duty of fairly
representing all employees in the bargaining unit. The procedure could be
beneficially implemented without employer interference. '0I0
96. See Havas v. Communications Workers of Am., 509 F. Supp. 144, 150 (N.D.N.Y.
1981); Lohr v. Association of Catholic Teachers Local 1776, 416 F. Supp. 619, 622-23 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
97. 573 F. Supp. at 1520 n.19; see also Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 103 S. Ct.
1467, 1475 (1983) (if an employer could unilaterally define or proscribe union actions, it would
give the employer considerable leverage over the manner in which the union performed its
duties).
98. See supra text accompanying notes 21-55.
99. The Supreme Court has held that since unions possess the facts and records from which
the fair share fee is calculated, the unions should bear the burden of proving that the calculation
is fair. Allen, 373 U.S. at 122.
100. Another possible alternative exists in Illinois under the new Illinois Educational Labor
Relations Act. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 1701-1721 (1983). Section II of the new Act authorizes
the employer and the union to negotiate fair share provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
Section 5 creates an Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (IELRB) consisting of three
members appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. The IELRB
has the power to hear charges of unfair labor practices filed pursuant to Section 14. Presumably,
under this new act, objecting non-members could file an unfair labor practice charge against
both the employer and the union, charging that the union's alleged impermissible expenditures
violated their section 14 rights. The IELRB would then have the power to investigate the
complaints and, if necessary, hold a complete administrative hearing. Section 16 then allows
for judicial review of the IELRB's findings. This process would seem to comply with the
minimum constitutional standards required by Hudson, without creating the innumerable prac-
tical problems associated with imposing the burden on the public employer.
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The Categorization of Expenses
With the Hudson decision, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit
subsequent to Ellis to hold that a union's fair share dues may not be used
to finance "intermediate" expenses,"' which are defined as those expenses
incurred in exclusive representation that are not germane to collective bar-
gaining.10 2 The most troubling aspect of the Hudson decision is that public
sector unions in the Seventh Circuit cannot charge non-members for expenses
genuinely related to the costs of exclusive representation.
There are two views on the constitutionally permissible use of non-mem-
bers' fair share fees." 3 The first approach presumes that only political
activities may not be financed by fair share fees.104 Under this view, a union
can charge non-members for all activities except those purely political in
nature. The question of the appropriateness of challenged expenditures under
the first view is limited to the extent to which the union activities implicate
serious first amendment concerns. The second view presumes that only those
expenses directly related to the union's cost of contract negotiation and
collective bargaining may be financed through the fair share fee. 05 Not
101. 743 F.2d at 1199 (Flaum, J., concurring).
102. Intermediate expenses include expenditures incurred for social activities, union conven-
tions and legal matters not directly related to contract negotiation and administration. R. Clark,
Fair Share Agreements Following Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railroad & Airline Clerks: A Man-
agement Perspective (unpublished manuscript). Professor Clark also determined that the pro-
portion of union expenditures on political and ideological activities amounts to less than 15%
of a unions total expenditures.
103. See T. HAGGARD, supra note 7, at 139-40.
104. This suggests a division of expenditures into two categories: expenditures directly related
to political activities and all other expenses. For examples of courts accepting this approach,
see Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1228
(1985), Champion v. California, 738 F.2d 1082, 1085-86 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied sub nom,
Champion v. Deukmejian, 105 S. Ct. 1230 (1985), and Seay v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 371
F. Supp. 754, 761-62 n.17 (C.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 533 F.2d
1126 (9th Cir. 1976). The district court in Seay suggested:
Dissenting employees in an agency fee situation should not be required to support
financially union expenditures as follows:
One, for payments to . . . any candidate for public office . . . or
Two, for payments to . . . any political party or organization, or
Three, for the holding of any meeting or the printing or distribution of any literature
or documents in support of any such candidate or political party or organization ....
[A]s to expenditures for other purposes, regardless of their political nature, . . . I feel
that they are sufficiently germane to collective bargining to require dissenting employees
who are subject to [union security] agreements to bear their share of that burden.
371 F. Supp. at 761-62 n.7.
105. The second view identifies two categories of expenditures: (1) those expenditures directly
related to the union's duty as collective bargaining agent; and (2) all others, including but not
limited to those expenditures that are political or ideological in nature. For examples of courts
accepting this approach, see Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1192-93; Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline
& S.S. Clerks, 91 L.R.R.M. 2339, 2342-43 (S.D. Cal. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 685
F.2d 1065 (9th Cir. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 104 S. Ct. 1883 (1984). The district
court in Ellis listed the activities which dissenting employees could not be compelled to subsidize:
(1) Recreational, social and entertainment expenses for activities not attended by
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surprisingly, the range of permissible expenditures varies widely under the
two approaches. The Supreme Court has definitively rejected the latter
approach and focused only on political union expenditures that impinge
directly on first amendment rights."' 6 By implication, the Supreme Court has
sanctioned a union's authority to charge for "intermediate" expenses.1
0 7
Beginning with Hanson, the Supreme Court recognized that union security
presented a wide range of first amendment problems. 0 Accordingly, the
Court held that fair share fees that covered expenses "within the realm of
collective bargaining" did not violate dissenting employees' first amendment
rights.1°9 Similarly, the Street Court was concerned solely with the union's
use of exacted funds to support "political causes." ' ' Subsequently, in Allen
and Abood, the Court held that there was no first amendment violation as
long as unions used compelled fees only "in support of activities germane
to collective bargaining.""' While lower courts initially split on the permis-
sible scope of expenditures," 2 the Supreme Court in Ellis rejected a narrow
interpretation. In Ellis, the Court recognized that non-union employees were
management personnel of Western Airlines.
(2) Operation of a death benefit program.
(3) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC (Brotherhood of Railway,
Airline and Steamship Clerks) among Western Airlines bargaining unit em-
ployees.
(4) Organizing and recruiting new members for BRAC and/or seeking collective
bargaining authority or recognition for:
(a) employees not employed by Western Airlines;
(b) employees not employed in the air transportation industry;
(c) employees noi employed in other transportation industries.
(5) Publications in which substantial coverage is devoted to general news, recrea-
tional and social activities, political and legislative matters, and cartoons.
(6) Contributions to charities and individuals.
(7) Programs to provide insurance, medical and legal services to the BRAC mem-
bership or portions thereof, other than such programs secured for its salaried
officers and employees.
(8) Conducting and attending conventions of BRAC.
(9) Conducting and attending conventions of other organizations and/or labor
unions.
(10) Defense or prosecution of litigation not having as its subject matter the nego-
tiation or administration of collective bargaining agreements or settlement or
adjustment of grievances or administration of collective bargaining agreements
or settlement or adjustment of grievances or disputes of employees represented
by BRAC.
(1I) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending or existing legislative measures.
(12) Support for or opposition to proposed, pending or existing governmental
executive orders or decisions.
91 L.R.R.M. at 2342-43.
106. See infra text accompanying notes 115-18.
107. See supra note 102.
108. 351 U.S. at 236.
109. Id. at 238.
110. 367 U.S. at 750.
Ill. Allen, 373 U.S. at 121; Abood, 431 U.S. at 235.
112. See supra notes 43-44.
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"free rider[s]"''1 in union contracts. The Court also acknowledged the
government's interest in requiring that non-union employees contribute to
the costs of exclusive representation and that unions need "flexibility in
[their] use of compelled funds.""' Noting that union security was itself an
infringement on the first amendment, the Court perceived little additional
infringement in allowing the union to charge for national conventions, social
activities, and monthly publications.' 5 The Court held that union expendi-
tures were constitutional if they were necessarily or reasonably incurred for
the purpose of exclusive representation."16 The Court stated that, under this
test, non-members could be charged not only for the direct costs of collective
bargaining but also for activities or undertakings "normally or reasonably
employed to implement or effectuate the duties of the union as exclusive
representative of the employees in the bargaining unit."' 7 Consequently, the
Ellis test allows unions to charge non-members for a wide range of operating
expenditures. 's
The Hudson panel, however, disregarded the Ellis test and took a narrow
view of permissible union expenditures under a fourteenth amendment "lib-
erty" analysis." 9 Since the fundamental concept of liberty embodied by the
fourteenth amendment due process clause incorporates the liberties guaran-
teed by the first amendment, the Seventh Circuit recognized that due process
protections must accompany any deprivation of constitutionally protected
liberties. 20 Yet, the Hudson court inexplicably determined that the scope of
procedural protections was different under the first and fourteenth amend-
ments.2'
113. "Free riders" are employees who gain the benefits of the union's duty of fair represen-
tation without paying their proportionate share of the costs. See, e.g., Transcript of Proceedings,
Presidential Emergency Board No. 98, appointed pursuant to Exec. Order No. 10306, Nov. 15,
1951, p. 150 (statements of George M. Harrison, spokesman for the Railway Labor Executives'
Association) (a "free rider" is a "guy who drags his feet, a term which is applied by unions
to non-members who obtain, without cost to themselves, the benefits of collective bargaining
procured through the efforts of the dues-paying members"); see also S. GOMPERS, 12 AMERICAN
FEDERATIONIST 221 (1905) ("Nonunionist[s] who reap the rewards of union efforts without
contributing a dollar or risking the loss of a day, are parasites. They are reaping the benefit
from the union spirit, while they themselves are debasing genuine manhood.").
114. 104 S. Ct. at 1896.
115. Id. The Court acknowledged that union security provisions represented a significant
infringement on dissenting employees' first amendment rights by forcing them to financially
support a group with which they may disagree. The Court, however, believed that this first
amendment infringement was justified by the government's interest in industrial peace. Id.
(citing Abood, 431 U.S. at 222; Street, 367 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring); Hanson, 351
U.S. at 238).
116. 104 S. Ct. at 1892.
117. Id.
118. See also Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (union's duty as exclusive bargaining representative
encompasses difficult tasks requiring the expenditure of time and money).
119. 743 F.2d at 1194.
120. Id. at 1193.
121. The Seventh Circuit stated that "the two grounds we have suggested for regarding the
plaintiff's procedural challenge as properly brought under section 1983-free speech and due
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The court first found that the non-members' "free speech" interests
required protection by reasonable review procedures in order to prevent fair
share fees from being used for political purposes. 2 To this extent, Hudson
is consistent with prior Supreme Court decisions. The court further held,
however, that due process considerations required that the review procedures
make reasonably certain that the fair share fee was used solely for activities
directly related to collective bargaining, regardless of whether they were
political or ideological in nature.'23 The court believed that this would ensure
that dissenters were not deprived of their fourteenth amendment "liberty of
association" without due process of law. The Seventh Circuit admitted,
however, that the fourteenth amendment interest advanced in Hudson was
the same substantive right guaranteed by the first amendment: specifically,
the freedom not to associate.' 24 The Supreme Court recognized in Ellis that
dissenters' first amendment freedom not to associate is adequately protected
by prohibiting unions from spending compelled funds on political or ideo-
logical activities. 5 The Ellis analysis, therefore, should apply equally to the
right not to associate under the fourteenth amendment.
The Hudson court did not explain why the scope of impermissible ex-
penditures should differ according to the constitutional amendment upon
which the analysis is based. The Seventh Circuit's decision is therefore
problematic. Non-members have an undisputed constitutional right under
both the first and fourteenth amendments to be free from charges that
finance union political activities. The Seventh Circuit's extension of this
prohibition into the realm of potentially legitimate union functioning, how-
ever, ignores the Supreme Court's acceptance of union security and com-
pulsory financing of a broad range of'union activities.
The CTU Advance Reduction Remedy
The final issue addressed in Hudson was the validity of the CTU remedy.
The Seventh Circuit in Hudson held that a union may not set a fair share
fee which may later prove to be too high and use the excess payment interest-
process, as we have loosely called them-have different implications for the scope of protection."
Id. at 1194.
122. The court stated that: "[Flree speech ... implies that the public employer must establish
a procedure that will make reasonably sure that the wages of nonunion employees will not be
used to support those of the union's political and ideological activities that are not germane to
collective bargaining." Id.
123. Id. "[Dlue process ... implies that the procedure must make reasonably sure that those
employees' wages will not be used to support any union activities that are not germane to
collective bargaining, whether or not the activities are political or ideological." Id. (emphasis
in original).
124. Id. at 1193. The court noted: "The liberty in question is freedom of association." Id.
The court then said that the freedom of association had "a negative as well as a positive
dimension. 'Freedom of association .. .plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate,' " Id.
(quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 3252 (1984)).
125. 104 S. Ct. at 1896. See also supra text accompanying notes 113-18.
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free until it is later refunded.' 26 In so holding, Hudson clearly departs from
Supreme Court precedent.' 27 Although the CTU plan did not include interest
bearing escrow accounts, 21 it provided an advance reduction scheme and
rebate procedure. The disjunctive language in Ellis permits a union to choose
an advance reduction scheme "and/or" an interest bearing escrow account.
It is not necessary, under Ellis, for a union to employ both suggested
alternatives. 2 9 Had the Seventh Circuit adhered to a literal reading of Ellis,
the absence of an escrow system would not have been enough to render the
whole CTU program unconstitutional.
The Seventh Circuit's invalidation of the CTU remedy is also inconsistent
with the policies articulated in past Supreme Court decisions that addressed
the remedy issue. In Street, Allen, Abood, and Ellis the Supreme Court
recognized that any remedy for excess fair share fees would need to balance
individual rights against legitimate union functioning.' 30 In Ellis, the Court
126. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1196.
127. Beginning in Street and Allen, the Supreme Court suggested that a practical remedy for
employee objections to the union's use of agency fees would be to refund that portion of the
deducted fee representing political expenditures, and to reduce future deductions proportionately.
Street, 367 U.S. at 774-75; Allen, 373 U.S. at 122. In Street the Court suggested two possible
remedies: arn injunction against the union's expenditure of non-members' dues on political
causes, and a refund of the portion of the dues earmarked for impermissible expenditures.
Street, 367 U.S at 774-75.
Similarly, the Court in Allen indicated the appropriateness of the Street remedies and stated
that a reduction of future dues would further protect non-members' rights. 373 U.S. at 122.
The Court noted that this type of remedy could be enforced with a minimum of administrative
difficulty and without the danger of unduly burdening legitimate union functioning. Id.
The Abood Court found that a satisfactory remedy must both prevent dissenters from having
to subsidize political activities and preserve the union's ability to require all employees to
contribute to the cost of collective bargaining activities. 431 U.S. at 237.
Finally, in Ellis the Court took a definitive stance and struck down what it termed a "pure
rebate" remedy. 104 S. Ct. at 1890. The pure rebate remedy struck down in Ellis allowed the
union to charge non-members full union dues, months later refunding that portion of the dues
expended for impermissible purposes. Id. In invalidating the pure rebate scheme, the Court
emphasized that it had not lost sight of the necessity of balancing individual rights and legitimate
union functioning. Id. at 1890, 1896. The Ellis court suggested that as alternatives to the pure
rebate remedy, an advance reduction of dues "and/or" interest-bearing escrow accounts would
place only the "slightest additional burden on the union." Id. at 1890.
128. Although the CTU plan provided for advance reduction, there was no escrow provision
for disputed funds. After the plaintiffs in Hudson commenced their suit, the CTU began to
voluntarily place dissenters' agency fees in escrow. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1197. Although the
Seventh Circuit approved of this step, it stated that it would be better if the CTU turned
management of the escrow account over to a bank or trust company. Id.
129. For example, the New Jersey statute in Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1228 (1985) incorporated only one of the suggested alternatives
outlined in Ellis. 741 F.2d at 602. The dissent in Robinson argued that for the statute to be
constitutional, it must incorporate both of Ellis' protective mechanisms. Id. at 618. The majority,
however, disagreed and correctly interpreted Ellis to allow for "two" acceptable alternatives.
Id. at 612 n. 12. Since the statute in question satisfied one of the two alternatives, the Third
Circuit held that "[tihis protection is all that Ellis mandates." Id.
130. See generally Street, 367 U.S. at 771-72 (striking down injunction restraining enforcement
of union shop agreement because the injunction unduly interfered with union's ability to spend
compelled funds necessary to effectuate congressional plan of having all employees who benefit
share in costs of collective bargaining); Allen, 373 U.S. at 123-24 (recognizing that no remedy
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was concerned that a pure rebate system would compel non-members to lend
money to the union for objectionable purposes.'3' According to the Supreme
Court, an advance reduction "and/or" an interest bearing escrow account
sufficiently protected dissenters' first amendment rights without unduly bur-
dening legitimate union functioning.'32 The CTU advance reduction remedy
was consistent with Ellis and effectuated the proper balance. The advance
reduction was carefully calculated and even erred in favor of non-members. 33
As an additional safeguard, the union provided a rebate remedy. Those
dissenters who proved that an error in the union's calculation had occurred
were entitled to a rebate of the amount already impermissibly deducted plus
a proportionate reduction in future payments.
Acknowledging that the CTU remedy, unlike the one disapproved in Ellis,
provided for advance reduction, the Hudson court inexplicably found such
a difference "immaterial.'' 34 The court's unwillingness to distinguish between
the remedies was apparently based on its displeasure with the CTU's pre-
deduction percentage. Observing that the discount in Hudson was "only
507o," the court implied that this amount was not a sufficient cushion to
protect non-members' rights.'35 The court's conclusion ignores the district
court's finding that the union's careful calculation militated against an
unreasonably high fair share determination.' 3 6 Also, it is not clear from the
court's opinion whether even the addition of an escrow system would have
saved the CTU remedy. By invalidating the CTU remedy, the Seventh Circuit
ignored the Ellis decision and failed to properly balance the competing
interests necessary to effectuate the policies underlying the doctrine of union
security.
would be appropriate if it infringed on the union's right to expend compelled fees); Abood,
431 U.S. at 237 (an appropriate remedy must prevent compulsory subsidization of ideological
activities without restricting the union's ability to require every employee to contribute to the
cost of collective bargaining activities); Ellis, 104 S. Ct. at 1890 (advance reduction of dues
and/or interest bearing escrow accounts place only the slightest additional burden on unions).
131. 104 S. Ct. at 1890.
132. Id.
133. The district court found that the CTU calculated the proportion of rebatable expenditures
to the lowest possible denominator. Even though the CTU's impermissible expenditures amounted
to 4.5946 percent of full union dues, the CTU rounded the figure off to 5 percent, thus giving
up approximately $16,000 in favor of non-members. This, the CTU reasoned, would provide
an extra cushion to cover inadvertant errors in calculation. 573 F. Supp. at 1509 n.4. See also
Allen, 373 U.S. at 122 (in view of the difficult accounting problems in calculating the fair
share fee, Court did not require absolute precision in such calculation).
134. 743 F.2d at 1196. The court stated:
It is true that in Ellis the union had made no effort to determine in advance what
fraction of its dues was not pertinent to collective bargaining and therefore should
not be charged to objecting non-members. But that is an immaterial difference, at
least on the facts of this case.
Id.
135. Id. at 1196-97. The court noted that in Robinson v. New Jersey, 741 F.2d 598 (3d Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1228 (1985), the Third Circuit found that a 15076 advance
reduction in non-members' dues provided a sufficient cushion. Yet the court stated, "[hiere
the advance reduction was only 5 percent." Id.
136. See supra note 133.
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IMPACT
The Hudson decision is particularly troubling because it represents a
decided defeat for public sector unionism in the Seventh Circuit. The court's
decision cripples the effectiveness of union security as a method of preventing
the "free rider" problem. The future application of public sector union
security is therefore in doubt, at least in the Seventh Circuit.
The court's decision frustrates the process of effective public sector labor
relations in several ways. The public employer now has the duty of ensuring
that a union does not violate employees' constitutional rights.'37 This duty
gives the employer leverage to veto specific union allocations and expendi-
tures, thereby creating a serious imbalance in bargaining power.'38 This
imbalance will complicate the public sector bargaining process and jeopardize
the delicate equilibrium in labor-management relations. After Hudson, the
employer has the affirmative duty of establishing procedures which protect
dissenters' constitutional rights. 39 This duty exposes employers to potential
legal liability, and many public employers in the Seventh Circuit may there-
fore find these duties too onerous. As a result, they may accordingly decline
to accept fair share provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
Even unions that successfully negotiate fair share provisions into labor
contracts can no longer charge non-members for intermediate expenses.' 4°
As a result, non-members' dues will differ significantly from full union dues.
As the amount of non-members' dues decreases, the financial incentive for
individuals to refrain from official union membership increases. Thus, there
will be more non-members and proportionately less money for the union to
effectively carry out its statutory duty of exclusive representation. Such
financial instability jeopardizes meaningful collective bargaining by encour-
aging the employer to be obstinate in hopes of forcing a favorable agreement
from a weak union.' 4'
The Hudson decision also exacerbates the free rider problem. Since the
union must continue to function as the exclusive representative of all em-
ployees, the court's decision allows non-union employees to enjoy the benefits
of the bargaining process while union members are forced to assume most
of the financial burden of administration. The result again is financial
instability for the union, since the union members may not be able to
adequately finance the negotiation and administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.
CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court has accepted union security in the public
sector, several issues remain unresolved as evidenced by the Seventh Circuit's
137. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1192, 1194.
138. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
139. Hudson, 743 F.2d at 1191, 1194.
140. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
141. See Blair, supra note II, at 189.
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recent decision in Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local 1. In Hudson,
the court fashioned procedures that place excessive burdens on the public
employer. The employer must now be the insurer of its employees' consti-
tutional rights in disputes with the union. This duty gives the public employer
excessive power in the bargaining process. Also, to ensure against potential
Hudson liability, employers must now scrutinize union allocations and ex-
penditures. This gives the public employer a veto power over the union's
use of non-members fees on activities which the employer believes are
impermissible. These results, coupled with the Hudson court's new limita-
tions on the scope of permissible expenditures, frustrate the collective bar-
gaining process. Finally, due to the increased burden of reviewing dissenters'
claims, public employers may potentially refuse to incorporate fair share
provisions in collective bargaining agreements. Not only would this further
exacerbate the bargaining process, it is inconsistent with prior Supreme Court
decisions which expressly encourage the use of union security.
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